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With the advent of digital technologies, platforms have become a digital business 
model with the power to disrupt organizations and industries. Firms are eager to 
exploit digital platforms’ immense potential for user growth but find themselves 
facing challenges and limitations that cannot be overcome with traditional business 
expertise. Our study focuses on exploring what roles user volume, transaction 
efficiency, and producer capability play in digital platform growth and how such 
interact and impact the aforementioned growth. Further, the study aims to gain 
insights into how to foster platform growth under certain limitations and proposes a 
framework by combining two acknowledged growth models. The combined 
framework aims to help firms to comprehend the mechanisms behind platform 
growth and to guide their efforts in growing a digital platform. The study adopts a 
qualitative approach employing a case study of a young central European software 
firm. Data was collected through semi-structured interviews and analyzed using 
thematic analysis. The findings suggest practice to differ substantially from theory 
and firms facing contextualities and limitations on their platform journey might have 
difficulties applying models and theories as proposed in literature. Our study sheds 
light on various strategic challenges when building a platform, especially when 
pursuing a hybrid business model with a digital marketplace. By critically discussing 
the observed platform journey of building a digital marketplace, the study helps firms 
and leaders to be aware of the challenges and risks, and aids to make informed 
decisions. The combined framework is expected to help firms to understand the 
importance of the suggested key variables and guide their efforts. 
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Platforms as a concept, albeit referred to as marketplaces or trade fairs, have existed 
ever since medieval times where buyers and sellers came together to enjoy a great 
offering and efficient exchange of various goods and services (Tadelis, 2016; 
Tiwana, 2014). However, the advent of modern technology enabled the evolvement 
of the platform into becoming digital. Technology’s pervasive penetration, together 
with its highly flexible and open affordances, effectively improved the platform’s 
capabilities (Yoo et al., 2012), and subsequently, the digital platform has become a 
certainty in several industries (Asadullah et al., 2018; Constantinides et al., 2018; de 
Reuver et al., 2018; Edelman, 2015; Parker, Van Alstyne, & Choudary, 2016; Van 
Alstyne & Parker, 2017). Various examples underline how the platform model has 
helped companies to become dominant players in their markets: Alibaba makes out 
more than 75% of Chinese e-commerce transactions, Google counts for 82% of 
mobile operating systems and 94% of mobile search traffic, while Facebook has 
become the world's dominant social platform (Van Alstyne & Parker, 2017). 
Not only have platforms become leaders in various markets, literature widely 
advocates companies operating within different fields to enter the platform business 
and exploit platforms as catalysts for rapid user growth (Parker, Van Alstyne, & 
Choudary, 2016; Van Alstyne et al., 2016) and innovation (Constantinides et al., 
2018; Tilson et al., 2010; Yoo et al., 2012). Thus, many companies that have been 
following a traditional pipeline business model are pursuing the shift to a hybrid 
business model, trying to build a digital platform on top of their existing core 
business. Yet, building a platform that provides enough interaction value to 
increasingly attract platform users is rather difficult, not only due to the common 
chicken-and-egg problem of getting first users onboard (Caillaud & Jullien, 2003; 
Hein, Schreieck, et al., 2019), but also due to various limitations rooted in a firm’s 
current and previous choices of product, market, processes, etc.  
For successfully entering the platform business, literature suggests firms to deploy a 
hybrid business model, where a platform is built on top of the core product (Zhu & 
Furr, 2016). By doing so, the platform holds the potential to share and grow the 
already existent customer base. The advantage of starting with an already existent 
customer base and given value proposition is expected to help overcoming the 
chicken-and-egg problem. However, firms employing a hybrid business model need 
to convert their customer base into platform users to reap the benefits and the 
occurrence of an already existing core business appears to bring critical limitations 
due to legacy in various areas. To successfully implement a hybrid business model 
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and grow a platform on top of their core product, firms and leaders need to know 
which areas are key to platform growth and how they are interconnected. Van 
Alstyne and Schrage (2016) identified user volume, transaction efficiency, and 
producer capability to be key for platform growth but saw them as part of distinctive 
models. No research has been done to examine the interaction and impact of given 
variables when mutually applied for platform growth. 
The objective of this study is to gain a deeper understanding of the above variables, 
their interrelationships, and their mutual effect on platform growth. This objective is 
guided by the following research question: 
RQ: What roles do the variables user volume, transaction efficiency, and 
producer capability play in platform growth? 
The central contribution of this study is to propose a framework for platform growth 
that combines the key variables discussed by Van Alstyne and Schrage (2016). 
Knowledge about the nature and applicability of mentioned key variables as well as 
their mutual effect on growth, ought to help leaders managing them more efficiently 
and thus guide their firms through the journey of building a platform. The framework 
as well as additional insights that will possibly surface throughout the study will 
contribute to the emerging literature on digital platforms as well as to contemporary 
research on platform growth. 
The paper begins with an overview of digital platform growth (§2) and derives the 
framework (§3) that will be used as a theoretical lens in the study. Thereafter, we 
present the method (§4), followed by the research context (§5) and findings (§6). 
The findings will be interpreted and reflected in the discussion (§7) and the paper 
ends with the conclusion (§8). 
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2 Digital platform growth overview 
In this section, the concept of the digital platform is introduced, as well as the digital 
marketplace as a subcategory. Further, different platform mechanics are discussed to 
understand how platforms work and how value is created. Finally, challenges of 
initial platform growth will be highlighted, as well as recommended approaches to 
overcome those. 
2.1 The digital platform 
The digital platform will be introduced by comparing different perspectives and 
definitions of the concept. Special focus is given to the application marketplace as a 
subcategory of the digital platform since it will help to theoretically position the case 
firm of this study and understand its specific setup. 
2.1.1 Evolution of concepts 
Literature conceptualizes the digital platform based on different views ranging from 
technical to market-based perspectives (Asadullah et al., 2018; Hein, Schreieck, et 
al., 2019). Platform definitions can be placed in three categories: technical, non-
technical, and socio-technical platforms. From engineering design literature comes 
the technical view of the platform where it is viewed as a technological architecture 
(Gawer, 2014). De Reuver et al (2018) define the digital platform as “an extensible 
codebase to which complementary third-party modules can be added” (p. 127). 
Gawer’s (2009) definition “a building block, providing an essential function to a 
technological system – which acts as a foundation upon which other firms can 
develop complementary products, technologies or services” is commonly adopted in 
literature and emphasizes the integral part of the system the digital platform 
constitutes (p. 2) (Asadullah et al., 2018; Spagnoletti et al., 2015; Yoo et al., 2012). 
In contrast to the technical view that focuses on platform innovation, the non-
technical view provides insight into platforms as commercial networks or markets 
that enable transactions among users (Abdelkafi et al., 2019; Asadullah et al., 2018). 
From this perspective, Tan et al (2015) regard the digital platform as “a commercial 
network of suppliers, producers, intermediaries, customers and producers of 
complementary products and services termed ‘complementors‘ that are held together 
through formal contracting and/or mutual dependency” (p. 2). Literature that focuses 
on this transactional aspect of the platform stresses its core function as the 
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orchestration of two or more interdependent user groups by matchmaking (Abdelkafi 
et al., 2019; Gawer, 2014; Hagiu & Wright, 2015; Ye et al., 2011). 
In between the technical and the non-technical platform lies the socio-technical 
platform, described from a cross-functional platform perspective that accommodates 
both transactional and innovational aspects. Thus, the digital platform is 
conceptualized as a multi-sided market while simultaneously being a technological 
architecture. De Reuver et al. (2018) denote this as the socio-technical view of the 
digital platform defined as “technical elements (of software and hardware) and 
associated organisational processes and standards” (p. 127). Software platforms are 
examples of socio-technical platforms (Abdelkafi et al., 2019) which “…bring 
together individuals and organizations so they can innovate or interact in ways not 
otherwise possible, with the potential for nonlinear increases in utility and value” 
(Cusumano et al., 2019, p. 13). As such, this study regards the digital platform 
holistically as a socio-technical entity comprised of an extensive and extensible 
codebase that facilitates value-creating interactions between distinctive user groups 
(Cusumano et al., 2019; Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2015; Van Alstyne & Parker, 
2017). 
2.1.2 The Application Marketplace 
Ghazawneh & Henfridsson (2015) refer to the digital application marketplace as “a 
platform component that offers a venue for exchanging applications between 
developers and end-users” (p. 198). These applications can be regarded as add-on 
software subsystems or complementary assets intended to extend the functionality 
of the basic platform (Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2015; Tiwana et al., 2010). Third-
party developers are often responsible for the design and development of the 
aforementioned add-ons. Henfridsson & Bygstad (2013) consider these add-ons as 
“executable pieces of software that are offered as applications, services or systems 
to end-users” (p. 175). Add-ons lead to increased user value and reach of the platform 
by covering more use cases without generating further development costs for the 
platform owner (Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2015; Henfridsson & Bygstad, 2013; 
Jacobides et al., 2018; Tiwana et al., 2010). The digital application marketplace 
assists platform owners in facilitating the exchange between end-users and third-
party developers (Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2015). The more such exchange is 
facilitated, the more likely it is for the platform to attract and consequently grow its 
user base. 
2.2 Platform mechanics 
This subsection lays out how digital platforms work and how value is generated on 
different sides. It is important to understand the logics and characteristics of digital 
platforms, as it differs substantially from the premises of traditional pipeline 
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businesses. Several interconnected key concepts will be introduced: two-sided 
markets and network effects, as well as matchmaking and value creation. 
2.2.1 Two-sided markets 
Two-sided markets are markets that “bring together (or match) two distinct groups 
in a relationship where the value for one group increases as the number of 
participants from the other group increases” (de Reuver et al., 2018, p. 125). A classic 
example of a two-sided market is a platform with buyers on one side and sellers on 
the other, such as Apple’s software application marketplace App Store (Asadullah et 
al., 2018; Hagiu & Wright, 2015). As depicted in Figure 1, users of the demand-side 
of the market are widely referred to as consumers while users of the supply-side are 
commonly referred to as producers (Van Alstyne et al., 2016). 
Figure 1. Visualization of a two-sided platform. Derived from (Ivarsson & Svahn, 
2020; Van Alstyne et al., 2016). 
The term multi-sided market is often used to stress the possibility of a given platform 
connecting more than two user groups (de Reuver et al., 2018; Tan et al., 2015). 
However, the operating logic of two- and multi-sided markets are identical since a 
two-sided market is per definition a multi-sided market. Both are driven by external 
value creation through network effects, a mechanism that is so essential, that 
literature regarding two-sided markets can be regarded as a subset of network effects 
(Gawer, 2014; Rysman, 2009).  
2.2.2 Network effects 
Network effects, or network externalities, refer to “the increasing value of platform 
membership to an entity as the number of other entities on the platform increases” 
(Tan et al., 2015, p. 250) or that “a technology’s usefulness increases as its installed 
base of users increases” (de Reuver et al., 2018, p. 125; Katz & Shapiro, 1994; 
Shapiro et al., 1998). While firms traditionally create value by internally optimizing 
resources and processes, platforms externally create value by enabling network 
effects that in turn facilitate interactions in multi-sided markets (Van Alstyne et al., 
2016). Network effects can either be same-side or cross-side (Abdelkafi et al., 2019; 
de Reuver et al., 2018; Gawer, 2014; Rochet & Tirole, 2003; Ruutu et al., 2017). 
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Same-side network effects take place when the value of a given platform depends on 
the number of users in the same user group. On the contrary, cross-side network 
effects arise when the value of a given platform depends on the number of users in a 
different user group. Cross-side network effects can be either unidirectional if the 
size of one user group increases the value of another, or bidirectional, if the volumes 
of both user groups increase each other’s value leading to self-reinforcing effects 
(Lerner, 2019; Reillier & Reillier, 2017). This can be observed in digital 
marketplaces such as eBay and Amazon, where the value of the platform increases 
for the sellers the more buyers that are present, and vice versa (Asadullah et al., 
2018). 
According to Van Alstyne and Parker (2017), value creation within a firm cannot 
scale as easily as outside of the firm. Thus, network effects create a clear advantage 
over traditional market models and are responsible for the immense success of digital 
platforms. However, for bidirectional network effects to arise and drive self-
sustaining growth, platforms are advised to reach a critical mass of platform users 
(Lerner, 2019; Ruutu et al., 2017; Zhu & Furr, 2016). The critical mass is achieved 
when, for example, customers can expect to find the services and products they need 
while the producers can expect to find the customers they need (Mancha et al., 2019). 
Once a platform reaches its critical mass, network effects are expected to take over 
“so that growth in demand generates growth in supply and vice versa.” (Mancha et 
al., 2019, p. 4; Ruutu et al., 2017). As a result, connecting a critical mass of users is 
necessary to benefit from bidirectional network effects and hence achieve self-
sustaining growth. For understanding a platform’s role in connecting users and 
enabling network effects, different forms of matchmaking have been discussed in 
literature. 
2.2.3 Matchmaking 
Matchmaking is a multidimensional process that includes both complex resource-
allocation and facilitating transactions between actors, but it also increases the 
“quality of matching supply with demand” (Holzmann et al., 2014; Ivarsson & 
Svahn, 2020, p. 5932). In essence, matchmaking improves “who gets what and why” 
(Roth, 2015, as cited in Ivarsson & Svahn, 2020, p. 5932). Matchmaking can be done 
through brokering or orchestration (Furr & Shipilov, 2018; Ivarsson & Svahn, 2020). 
In brokering, the matchmaker actively mediates between separated user groups 
(Ivarsson & Svahn, 2020). Brokering is argued to be suitable for stable environments 
with defined key issues, such as conventional linear value creation (Furr & Shipilov, 
2018) but also non-digital matchmaking (Ivarsson & Svahn, 2020). In addition, 
Ivarsson & Svahn (2020) highlight that firms practicing brokering intentionally keep 
actors separated. This separation forces the actors to indirectly interact through the 
matchmaker, which provides more control to the firm but also limits scalability. 
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In the context of platforms, matchmaking is more commonly done through 
orchestration, involving direct interactions between different user groups (Ivarsson 
& Svahn, 2020), following less defined requirements and objectives (Furr & 
Shipilov, 2018). Although orchestrating matchmakers are not actively involved in 
actual transactions, the intermediation is understood as matching the multiple sides, 
facilitating direct autonomous transactions (Ivarsson & Svahn, 2020; Tiwana, 2014). 
Furr & Shipilov (2018) argue that successful orchestration leads to numerous 
connections among various actors, enabling them to identify promising opportunities 
by working directly together. Thus, orchestration creates the foundation for further 
value-creation (Tiwana, 2014) and is generally portrayed in literature as a core 
mechanism of digital platforms, being much responsible for their success (Gawer, 
2014; Hein, Schreieck, et al., 2019; Mancha et al., 2019). To fully understand the 
connection between a platform's success and its transaction type, value creation will 
be discussed as a last key concept. 
2.2.4 Value creation 
According to Van Alstyne and Parker (2017), a platform’s main asset is its network 
of producers and consumers. The authors suggest that for platforms, in contrast to 
pipeline firms, “resource orchestration is more important than resource control, and 
facilitating interactions and managing relationships have a higher priority than 
internal optimization” (p. 26). Offering efficient and convenient orchestration 
enables digital platforms to shift the focus of value creation from within the firm to 
the outside (Hein, Soto Setzke, et al., 2019; Parker, Van Alstyne, & Jiang, 2016). 
This platform logic stands in stark contrast to pipeline business where value is 
created linearly according to the classic value chain model (Leong et al., 2019; Van 
Alstyne & Parker, 2017). Instead of engaging in an end-to-end linear refinement 
process, platform businesses and digital platforms “are designed with network-
centric thinking based on horizontal collaborations among participating users” 
(Ivarsson & Svahn, 2020; Leong et al., 2019, p. 1531; Van Alstyne et al., 2016). 
Consequently, for platforms, it is of utmost importance to prioritize and optimize the 
value creation through orchestrating of resources owned by external actors, rather 
than concentrating on customer value or the firm’s product in isolation (Leong et al., 
2019; Parker, Van Alstyne, & Jiang, 2016; Van Alstyne et al., 2016).  
Despite orchestration generally being seen as a core mechanism of digital platforms 
enabling external value creation and vast scalability (Gawer, 2014; Hein, Schreieck, 
et al., 2019), brokering can still be used in a given platform as a complementary 
transaction type (Ivarsson & Svahn, 2020). In doing so, potential brokering should 
arguably be decoupled from the core platform transaction mode, to not become an 
obstacle for external value creation and scalability. 
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2.3 Initial platform growth 
This subsection discusses the so-called chicken-and-egg problem and the common 
approach to overcome it through subsidization. In addition, less common approaches 
will be introduced, to get a holistic picture of possible solutions proposed in 
literature. 
2.3.1 The common approach 
Digital platforms that base their value proposition on cross-side network effects 
commonly face the so-called chicken-and-egg problem when trying to achieve initial 
growth (Caillaud & Jullien, 2003; Hein, Schreieck, et al., 2019). To provide value 
for potential customers, a sufficient number of producers must be providing their 
service or products on the platform. Producers, however, only see value in joining 
the platform if a satisfactory group of customers will be reached with the product or 
service (Mancha et al., 2019). The issue of growing the user base while none of the 
user groups is willing to join without adequate value from an already existing user 
base on the opposing market side was coined the chicken-and-egg problem by 
Caillaud & Jullien (2003). To realize the core value of a platform, the critical mass 
must be reached, assuring that a sufficient number of customers and producers will 
meet each other’s needs (Mancha et al., 2019). 
Widely observed among firms and commonly recommended in literature to 
overcome the chicken-and-egg problem is to subsidize one of the two market sides 
to subsequently grow both market sides (Gawer, 2014; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005; 
Rochet & Tirole, 2003). The choice of which market side to subsidize, or even attract 
with a free good, can be either done by examining the relative contribution of the 
different sides to network effects (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005) or by assessing 
which side shows the higher price-sensitivity (Evans & Schmalensee, 2016). 
Consequently, decisions about the pricing structure respectively which side to charge 
or subsidize, need to be made on top of the decision about the general level of pricing 
(Rochet & Tirole, 2003). Reaching the critical mass through subsidizing is an 
expensive approach, which makes undercapitalized platforms usually fail at this 
point (Mancha et al., 2019). Moreover, forecasting the critical mass is difficult and 
hence makes it challenging to raise or dedicate sufficient capital for subsidizing. 
2.3.2 Alternative approaches 
Focusing on increased interaction value as a catalysator for initial growth might be 
a less discussed but effective approach to overcome the chicken-and-egg problem in 
a sustainable and less costly way. Although reaching a sufficient volume of users is 
inevitable for self-reinforcing network effects, the critical mass can be reduced by 
increasing the value producers add to the platform (Mancha et al., 2019). 
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Empowering producers to create more value increases the interaction value as well 
as the overall platform value and should be done strategically (Van Alstyne & 
Schrage, 2016). The effect of increased producer-added value on lowering the 
critical mass can be argued to be amplified by reduced transaction costs, making the 
value of different user groups more accessible to each other. Thus, focusing on both 
producer capabilities and transaction efficiency might be used to lower the critical 
mass and foster network effects. In fact, Van Alstyne and Parker (2017) claim that 
most successful platforms have initially focused on a single type of interaction with 
a high value, before going for a larger volume. This is exemplified with Facebook, 
having started with a narrow focus before expanding the platform. 
Another solution to the chicken-and-egg problem is applying a hybrid business 
model (Zhu & Furr, 2016). When a platform is built on top of an existing business, 
the pre-existing installed base of users can be used to a firm’s advantage. The 
successful combination of employing both a product and a platform business model 
leads to the hybrid business model that intends to capture the benefits of both models. 
By using a hybrid business approach, a firm enjoys the advantage of using the 
immense potential of a platform for value creation, growth, and innovation, while 
not abandoning its core business that continuously attracts new customers. Starting 
with a defensible product and a critical mass of users helps to avoid the chicken-and-
egg problem, on the condition that both existing and new users can be encouraged to 
rapidly migrate to the new platform (Zhu & Furr, 2016). 
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3 Conceptual Framework 
In this section, two different platform growth models proposed and discussed by Van 
Alstyne & Schrage (2016) are introduced. Combining the two models leads to a 
framework that will be used as a theoretical lens for the study. 
3.1 Platform growth models 
Network effects are discussed in literature as the main asset of digital platforms 
(Mancha et al., 2019; Ruutu et al., 2017; Van Alstyne & Parker, 2017). A high 
volume of users increases the average value per transaction and improves the 
matchmaking between distinct users of a given platform. As previously discussed to 
successfully promote growth, digital platforms have commonly been advised to 
focus on reaching a critical mass, where self-reinforcing network effects become 
dominant (Ivarsson & Svahn, 2020; Mancha et al., 2019; Van Alstyne & Parker, 
2017; Zhu & Furr, 2016). Based on the importance of reaching a critical mass, 
platforms are widely driven by an efficiency model (Van Alstyne & Schrage, 2016) 
whose widespread use is reflected in digital platform literature (Leong et al., 2019). 
The efficiency model promotes enlarging the user base and reducing transaction 
costs as the two main focus areas to improve matchmaking and foster platform 
growth (Van Alstyne & Schrage, 2016).  
In contrast to the common efficiency model, Van Alstyne & Schrage (2016) 
introduced the platform investment model, arguing that sustainable growth is based 
on user capabilities of value creation. Platforms that empower their supply-side users 
by strategically increasing their capabilities to create and provide value to other 
platform participants, increase the average interaction value. Thus, the platform 
investment model promotes cultivating producer capabilities which is argued to be 
equally important as reducing transaction costs to grow a platform (Van Alstyne & 
Schrage, 2016).  
3.2 Deriving the framework 
When combining the efficiency model and the platform investment model, three 
variables can be identified as key areas for platform growth: user volume, transaction 
efficiency, and producer capability. As shown in Table 1, each variable is identified 
in literature as being key to increase the average transaction value and foster platform 
growth (Mancha et al., 2019; Van Alstyne & Parker, 2017; Van Alstyne & Schrage, 
2016; Zhu & Furr, 2016). 
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Table 1  
Overview of derived platform growth variables. 
 
The combination of the efficiency model and the platform investment model can be 
motivated by the logical deduction that the three key variables are interdependent, as 
illustrated in the following examples. The more users on a platform, the more 
possible transactions can be executed. In return, the better the transaction efficiency, 
the better both user groups can access each other and take advantage of the vast offer. 
The value provided by increased producer capability is amplified by the number of 
producers but depends on the transaction efficiency to be accessed by demand-side 
users. The examples show that the variables are not only adding up to each other but 
seem to be interlinked in a reinforcing manner. Likewise, any variable equaling zero 
is likely to eliminate possible network effects regardless of the other variables being 
present or not, as shown by the following. If there are no users on a platform, no 
transactions can be executed. If the transaction efficiency is low, user groups struggle 
to access each other and to take advantage of the value offering. If users are not 
capable of offering value to others, neither large user numbers nor high transaction 
efficiency can invigorate the platform. 
Consequently, a dynamic relationship between the three variables can be assumed, 




More users participating on a platform lead to a higher average 
value per transaction and improved matchmaking (Van Alstyne 
& Parker, 2017). When reaching the critical mass, network effects 
become the dominant force of further user base growth (Mancha 
et al., 2019; Van Alstyne & Schrage, 2016). 
Transaction  
Efficiency 
Reducing transaction costs, such as information or coordination 
costs, improves exchange efficiency and matchmaking (Leong et 
al., 2019). Digital platforms usually employ direct interactions 
between digital platform users which enables external value 
creation and orchestration through the platform owner (Ivarsson 
& Svahn, 2020). 
Producer 
Capability 
Strategic investments into producer capability increase 
producers’ competence to generate value and hence increase the 
average value per transaction. Investing into producer capability 




framework leads to two assumptions: 1) Firms that want to grow a platform need to 
focus their efforts on all three variables to facilitate self-reinforcing network effects. 
2) Firms that are limited in any of the presented variables can try to compensate for 
the limitation by intensifying efforts on the other key variables of growth. 
The combined framework provides a theoretical lens to the study. As such, it guides 
the collection and categorization of empirical data in the Method. Further, it will be 






In order to address the research questions, a qualitative case study was conducted. 
This method was adopted as it allows for in-depth insights into specific phenomena 
within their environmental context (Ridder, 2017; Yin, 2017) while also capturing 
the complexities of real-life situations (Zainal, 2007). Consequently, the method of 
choice was deemed suitable for the study as it allowed thorough exploration of the 
growth variables as underlying principles of platform growth. However, opting for a 
single-case study also brought limitations in terms of the study’s generalizability. As 
the empirical scope of the study was limited to the case firm and its context, the 
study’s relevance outside this context can be derived from literature but not from the 
researched case. Yet, as the proposed framework and growth variables originate from 
models intended for no pre-established context, it is likely that the study contains 
general insights regarding platform growth. The data were primarily collected 
through semi-structured interviews and complemented with unstructured interviews 
as well as secondary data. The data was analyzed using thematic analysis and 
categorized according to the theoretical lens provided by the conceptual framework. 
The following subsections outline the research setting, data collection, and data 
analysis. 
4.1 Research setting 
The single-case study was conducted between January and May 2021 and focused 
on a young central European software firm. Since its foundation in the early 2010s, 
the software firm, hereby denoted as the case firm, has scaled up significantly and 
now possesses a workforce in the hundreds with an international presence of both 
offices and customers. The case firm offers a professional Software as a Service 
(SaaS) application. In addition to the application’s core functionalities, additional 
features and functions are offered through a digital marketplace. The application 
marketplace houses complementary add-ons, commonly referred to as applications 
or apps, which enable further customization of the core product according to the 
users’ needs and wishes. Currently, the digital marketplace is undergoing a strategic 
transition where the focus is shifting from maximizing the number of add-ons to 
leveraging the existing marketplace offerings. The particular case firm was selected 
as they provided generous insight into their platform growth efforts by providing 




4.2 Data collection 
The data collected in the study consist of three different data types: semi-structured 
interviews, unstructured interviews, and secondary data (see Table 2 below for 
further details). The data collection started with the unstructured interviews to 
provide a general understanding of the case firm and its context as well as interview 
candidates and secondary data relevant to the study. The semi-structured interviews 
obtained data directly relevant to the research questions while the secondary data 
provided insight into the case firm’s formal internal processes and strategies. 
Table 2  
Overview of the data collected during the study. 
Data type Description Amount Time 
Interviews Unstructured 3 January 2021 –  
February 2021 
Semi-structured 7 March 2021 
Secondary data Internal 
documentation 
6 2018 - 2021 
The interviews were conducted remotely via videoconferencing software which by 
then had become widely normalized due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. 
Besides, the remote interviews allowed the authors to disregard the vast geographical 
distance to the respondents. Notes were taken during the unstructured interviews 
while the semi-structured interviews were also recorded (after consent was given) 
and transcribed. The interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. All respondents 
were informed that the case firm would be anonymized in the study. Lastly, to uphold 
internal anonymity, the respondents were assigned a random letter apart from the C-
level executive, see Table 3 below. 
Table 3 
List of interview respondents 
Role Respondent 
C-level executive A 
Product Manager, Senior Product Manager, 
Customer Success Manager/Engineer, 
Technical Partner Manager 
B, C, D, E  
(no reflective mapping) 
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E-Mail was used for follow-up questions and when clarifications were needed. The 
unstructured interviews proved useful to understand in what context and on which 
premises the case firm operates but it also played a major role in identifying relevant 
interview candidates for the semi-structured interviews. Secondary data was 
obtained from the respondents either via e-mail or during the interviews through the 
videoconferencing software and complemented the unstructured interviews in 
providing general knowledge and context regarding the case firm. 
The semi-structured interview approach was adopted as it provides a natural flow 
which creates space for the respondent to fully express themselves, the ability to 
improvise follow-up questions based on the responses, as well as the ability to probe 
into specific relevant issues and topics (Kallio et al., 2016; Longhurst, 2003). 
Conducting the interviews remotely through videoconferencing enabled the 
respondents to partake in the interviews from wherever they pleased. Consequently, 
it can be argued that conducting the interviews remotely may in fact improve the 
communication and hence information exchange as a result of the respondents 
enjoying high comfort in their physical interview environment (Bolderston, 2012; 
Seitz, 2016). Adams (2015) and Kallio et al. (2016) emphasize the importance of 
developing and following interview guides to conduct objective and trustworthy 
semi-structured interviews. Thus, such were developed following the study’s 
conceptual framework, ensuring that the interviews would progress in a relevant 
direction and hopefully provide valuable insights. 
4.3 Data analysis 
For analyzing the collected data, thematic analysis (TA) was used to identifying, 
analyzing, and reporting patterns in the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). TA offers great 
flexibility through its compatibility with different data types and provides a robust 
and acknowledged approach with the potential for “nuanced, complex, interpretative 
analysis” (Braun et al., 2016, p. 1; Clarke & Braun, 2013).  
After each interview, the notes taken during that interview, which constituted the 
filled-in interview guide, were scrutinized by the researchers to absorb, and annotate 
relevant initial analytic observations. Simultaneously, the notes were converted into 
transcripts with the help of the recordings to ensure that they accurately reflected 
what was said during the interview. Besides, as the recording was in video format, 
situational factors such as environmental contexts, behaviors, and nonverbal cues, 
which are typically lost when recording sound only, were maintained (Sutton & 
Austin, 2015). Such practice did not only result in familiarization with the data, the 
initial step of TA according to Braun & Clarke (2006), but it also helped to 
continuously refine the interview guides which are argued to be a work in progress 
(Adams, 2015). In the next step, the data was repeatedly read and systematically 
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examined to identify relevant segments and code them according to the conceptual 
framework. The relevant segments were transferred to a separate digital catalog 
where they were bundled according to their coding into topics and after further 
refinement eventually subtopics (see Appendix for coding example). Accordingly, 
segments that were concluded irrelevant remained uncoded and hence were not 
transferred to the catalog. As the interview guides were organized according to the 
conceptual framework and its three variables, most identified segments were already 
under a relevant topic and hence inherently pre-labeled with an applicable code, if 
not, they were coded accordingly. This simplified the analysis process significantly 
by having segments likely to be related pre-bundled. The above-described process 
was done non-linearly, meaning that the catalog was complemented with more 
segments and codes as the analysis and the interviews progressed. Once the 
interviews were concluded and the catalog was finalized, it was used to create the 




5 Case firm’s research context 
In this section, the research context derived from the collected data is presented to 
provide a comprehensive background description of the case firm. The context is 
categorized into subsections describing its platform strategy, journey as well as 
current setup. 
5.1 Strategy and Vision 
Although partially described as a start-up, the venture-funded firm has reached a size 
and growth where it can be seen as a permanent and scalable business. In 2018, the 
case firm decided to build a digital marketplace and reshape its strategy around 
pursuing a hybrid business model. According to Respondent B, the vision was 
defined as: ”SaaS enabled marketplace (SEM): Hybrid model where the product is 
standalone software supplemented with a marketplace. This is what [the case firm] 
will become as we build out our marketplace.”. 
Since building the marketplace has become an unquestioned part of the case firm’s 
efforts, the term hybrid model is not used internally anymore. As stated in 2018, the 
envisioned hybrid business model consists of the core product, a SaaS application, 
and a platform for complementary applications. Although the basic setup has been 
built and functionalities have been put into practice, the hybrid business model is 
seen more like a vision rather than the current state. Additionally, even though the 
core product was seen as standalone software, it is hard to strategically separate the 
core product and the marketplace. As Respondent E stated: 
“Our marketplace has always been focused on [the case firm]. It is hard to 
imagine what the marketplace would look like without [the case firm] because 
every tool in the marketplace ties into [the case firm].” 
After a heavy focus on organizational growth from 2018 to 2020, the case firm has 
now moved its focus on increasing organizational efficiency, which created a profit-
oriented vision for the marketplace. As Respondent C stated: “This requires us 
having proper margins. For me, the marketplace is a feature, way to up-sale 
additional functionality to existing user base, in order to increase per user-
profitability.”. Turning the marketplace into a business case calls for a focus on 
positive margins and low installation and maintenance costs. If done successfully, 
the user-profitability could be improved by selling several additional features to 
existing customers without a substantial cost of sale.  
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Besides the profit-oriented vision, there is also a growth-oriented vision for the 
marketplace, stressing the potential of the marketplace as a growth engine. 
Respondent A explained that vision as:  
“Marketplace as a lead generation tool […] you attract developers to have more 
apps. […] When we have more apps on the marketplace, that should help us 
attracting more customers. […] Developers get attracted by a strong customer 
or user base.” 
Consequently, efforts in attracting external developers and partners ought to lead to 
an increased number of available add-ons increasing the number of use cases of the 
case firm’s software. More extensive coverage of use cases is expected to work as a 
user magnet that generates general user growth for the case firm. 
A third view on the marketplace is that instead of being used for profit or user growth, 
it should be used for retention by binding customers to the case firm’s core product 
and hence preventing them from switching to competitors. Being able to use various 
tools and external platforms through the extended core product is expected to 
increase the costs of switching to a competitor’s software. Respondent E explained: 
“We can see that if we have customers using our marketplace apps, they are less 
likely to churn, they are more likely to stick around. […] I see them [add-ons] as an 
investment in keeping our customers as customers.”. With this perspective, running 
the marketplace and installing add-ons for customers is seen as a long-term 
investment that does not need to create financial profit in the short run. 
5.2 The platform journey 
As repeatedly pointed out during the interviews, the current marketplace setup which 
is deploying brokering to connect producers with customers might be seen as an 
inefficient, yet not necessarily wrong transaction type per se. Rather, brokering is 
perceived as the natural solution to foster matchmaking and transactions given where 
the case firm currently is in its journey of building a digital marketplace. Respondent 
B explained: 
”At our level (companies that are similar in size to [the case firm]), most 
prospects and customers care more about the volume and diversity of 
marketplace apps than the marketplace infrastructure (purchasing integrations 
directly from the marketplace).” 
Thus, brokering is seen as a transitional solution. Respondent B pointed out what 
they regard as a typical platform journey, based on their assessment of firms building 
similar platforms on top of their core product: 
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1) Pre-marketplace. Firms in this stage usually provide a webpage where they 
list partners, sometimes with descriptions of possible integrations. 
2) Marketing marketplace. Firms deploy a marketplace page with referral 
listings. Prospects and customers cannot install applications directly through 
the marketplace but need to get in touch with an account executive or 
customer success manager. 
3) Automated marketplace. Firms deploy a marketplace where IT-affine 
prospects and customers can install and configure applications without 
substantial help from the platform owner. 
4) Advanced marketplace. Applications are completely out of the box and do 
not require any back-end configuration by the platform owner. The financial 
transaction is also done through the marketplace. ADP Marketplace and 
Slack App Directory are examples of advanced application marketplaces. 
At the time of the interviews being conducted, the case firm is deploying two 
marketplaces simultaneously, resulting from their followed platform journey. The 
earlier built marketplace is what they see as a marketing marketplace, publicly 
accessible through their webpage and mainly used for marketing purposes. Owned 
and designed by the marketing department, this marketplace has no installation 
process in place, but a call-to-action (CTA) button leading to a contact form to get 
in touch with the case firm and ultimately, request a free demo of possible 
applications.  
In a subsequent step, the so-called dashboard marketplace got created, to deploy a 
marketplace where installation and configuration could be automated. This 
marketplace is only accessible for customers through their core product profile and 
provides a CTA for installing the single application. However, when pressing the 
CTA button, a ticket will get created within the case firm and the customer will have 
to wait for the case firm or a firm’s partner (in case of a third-party application) to 
reach out and undertake the setup and configuration. Thus, brokering will continue 
to be the inevitable transaction type as long as no further automation will be put in 
place. 
5.3 Current setup 
The producer side of the marketplace consists of the case firm itself, marketplace 
partners that have signed a partner agreement, and regular external developers. The 
different available applications can be separated into first and third-party 
applications, not depending on whether they were built in-house or externally, but 
rather depending on whether only internal data is involved, or the application 
connects with an external product or platform. Respondent B explained: 
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“A first-party app would be something like installing form templates, Home 
widgets, or checklist templates - all of the data involved is within [the case firm]. 
Most of the time, 1st party apps are developed by the company itself, but this is 
not always the case - the company could employ external developers to do it.” 
Consequently, first-party applications either highlight functionalities of the case 
firm’s core product or provide any kind of additional service that does not involve 
externally hosted data. Third-party applications on the other hand are integrations to 
existing external services, either to major actors (mainly built in-house) or to smaller 
players that see an interest in joining the case firm's platform. At the current state, all 




In this section, the findings regarding the key variables of platform growth are 
presented together with their interconnection before the summary of the key findings. 
6.1 User volume 
As previously mentioned, the marketplace consists of a producer and a customer side 
which together make up the user volume. The volume of each side was throughout 
the interviews described as essential. Producer volume was regarded as important to 
increase the number of add-ons on the marketplace which in its turn enhances the 
product’s use case coverage. For instance, Respondent A argued that add-ons are 
necessary for the case firm realizing its strategy: "[the case firm] wants to be this 
single point of contact for the end-users and we can only achieve this product 
ambition if we integrate with other most relevant tools, otherwise it is not doable.”. 
The customer volume, on the other hand, is not only essential for the overall platform 
growth but also determines the attractiveness for producers to provide add-ons and 
can be utilized as a revenue stream. 
During the interviews, network effects were repeatedly brought up regarding user 
volume. Considered very desirable, some respondents emphasized that cross-side 
network effects, to some degree, were already present on the marketplace despite its 
limited size. The critical mass of customers needed to trigger network effects was 
seen as unique to each producer. Respondent A commented on the critical mass of 
customer volume: “It is not really black and white; it really depends on the 
company” and exemplified his statement with the following: 
“A developer would not build on top of a platform that does not have any users. 
[…] The exact number probably also depends on the partner. I think for a start-
up, or a pre-series A company, we already have a very interesting number of 
customers and users. But for a company like Microsoft, we don't. I think that a 
pre-series A start-up would build things on top of [the case firm]. But for 
companies like Microsoft, we actually have to build the integrations, or we have 
to ask a partner to build the integrations for us.” 
When asked to describe the current focus regarding user volume, Respondent B 
expressed that “You caught us in a major transformation, [the newly appointed 
Product Manager] will be shaping it from now on.”. Around the same time the data 
collection for the study was initiated, a Product Manager was recruited to define and 
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redefine the marketplace strategy; a process that would exceed the study’s timeframe 
and thus not be further followed. The initial strategy focused on producer volume as 
a vehicle to increase the number of add-ons available on the marketplace. Once the 
marketplace offering grew sufficiently, the focus started to shift towards the 
customer side in terms of volume. The shift could be observed through increased 
efforts directed towards selling and increasing the value proposition of the existent 
marketplace offering. Respondent B commented: "I don’t see it [producer volume] 
expanding drastically in the near future because we are really focusing on getting 
deeper with our existing integrations.". 
The user volume is limited by the fact that the marketplace is not open, meaning that 
actors cannot take on the role of either side without fulfilling certain criteria. Firstly, 
for customers to access the marketplace, they must hold an active subscription of the 
core product where the marketplace is embedded. Secondly, the complementary add-
ons offered on the marketplace provide no value themselves as they only function as 
complements to the core product. Consequently, marketplace customers must 
inherently be customers of the case firm’s core product. As Respondent D explained: 
“Customers don't just show up by themselves, they need to close a contract with [the 
case firm] first.”. As such, the marketplace customer volume will always be a subset 
of the core product’s or, as expressed by Respondent E: “ideally, 100% [of our] 
customers would be using apps”. Furthermore, producers cannot easily build and 
deploy add-ons to the marketplace. Respondent C explained that:  
“It is not an open marketplace where you have an idea, you write it up and 
publish it to the marketplace. If someone wants to build something, it still goes 
through either our partners or product teams, so there is no open app 
development path right now. You can look at the APIs and so on, but there is 
no way, no mechanism, to post that app on the marketplace. […] Because of 
that, we do control what is needed, what is being built, and what we will 
provide.“ 
The reason for the case firm to stay in full control of the marketplace is not only 
described as ensuring quality, but also the integrity of the core product. Respondent 
A exemplified: 
“There are some legal compliance things. For example, where is the data 
hosted? If someone is creating a third-party app, [these applications] are also 
going through a different data center. We claim that we are GDPR compliant 
– can we still be GDPR compliant if the data is going through a different data 
center?” 
Consequently, the case firm, alike the platform owner, acts as a gatekeeper which 
provides full control of the producer volume. However, a producer is not limited to 
23 
 
providing only a single add-on, although that has been the norm until now (apart 
from applications developed by the case firm itself).  
Lastly, the customers of the marketplace are not necessarily the end-users but more 
commonly internal functions responsible for IT system purchasing. Consequently, 
the actual end-users are unlikely to have a major impact in making decisions 
concerning the tool. When talking about contextual limitations regarding user 
volume, Respondent A described their current environment: 
“What is also a bit special in the case of [the case firm] is that the users are in 
many cases not the buyers. I think that is a bit unique. Because when you think 
of products like Slack or Atlassian, you can probably add certain bots on your 
own, but our users would not add an integration to [the case firm].” 
Respondent D elaborated on the involvement of end-users with the following: 
“[…] there might not be an incentive to actually do this [end-users visiting 
the marketplace]. [The case firm] is a B2B tool, so it gets set up in a company 
through some internal function, like internal communication or operations or 
HR and then they make it available for the employees to be used. So usually 
there is a certain context where the marketplace is being used. And it is 
usually in the setup phase that it is usually set up with everything that is 
needed.” 
6.2 Transaction efficiency 
Within the case firm, the transaction process set up for the marketplace is widely 
perceived as inefficient. While some employees stress out the potential of improving 
the automation to scale the marketplace further, others see improving automation 
rather as causing high costs that would not be reasonable at the current state of the 
platform. Respondent B shed light on both sides: 
”I don't think it's possible to bypass talking about automation when we talk 
about the growth of [the case firm]'s marketplace. It's the natural next stage: 
usually the initial goal of a company is to add a larger number of integrations 
and offerings on their marketplace […] then you have a problem of scale, as 
most marketplace processes will probably be manual.” 
“It only makes sense to invest the time and resources to automate when there's 
a critical mass of offerings on the marketplace and the manual processes are 
too much to handle, […]” 
Thus, the key question discussed in the case firm seems to not necessarily be whether 
the marketplace is efficient or not, but rather whether the transaction process 
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currently in place is efficient enough for the current state of the platform. It seems 
generally agreed, that in case of extensive growth, the case firm would have to invest 
in further automation. Possible improvements for efficient transactions are mainly 
visioned in three areas according to Respondent A. 
1. Discovering applications. In the ideal case, customers explore the 
marketplace by themselves. They should be able to find all the information 
needed to make a purchase or be able to directly try the application through 
a free trial or a light version. 
2. Buying applications. In the ideal case, customers should be able to directly 
buy and pay through the marketplace, without separately conducting a 
monetary transaction. 
3. Deploying applications. In the ideal case, partners and external developers 
should be able to easily upload applications on the marketplace and 
independently change application descriptions. 
Out of the mentioned areas, the first one is most commonly seen by the respondents 
as the main area hindering marketplace growth. The process of uploading and 
deploying an application to the marketplace as well as the process of buying is said 
to be sufficiently addressed through manual work. However, several employees 
agree that customers need to be able to discover and experience applications. The 
fact that applications in the marketplace are not out of the box, might be a reason for 
customers to lose interest and not come back to the marketplace for further 
exploration. Yet, Respondent E pointed out that customers might be used to the rather 
inefficient process and perceive it as normal for a software provider of the size of the 
case firm. Even with a fully automated self-service marketplace in place, a customer 
company might not be able to make use of directly executable transactions, due to 
internal hierarchy, budgets, and decision making.  
Finally, even the employees that favor a more automated marketplace see it as a 
resource problem and mostly prioritize other projects. As expressed by Respondent 
A:  
“It is a lot about resources, we cannot do everything. […] Efficiency is a nice 
problem to have. I think you should set it [the marketplace] up with a manual 
process and if it’s not scaling anymore you can invest in efficiency. But investing 
into efficiency from the beginning might be the wrong investment. 
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6.3 Producer capability 
When coding the collected data, producer capability was found to consist of several 
subthemes. The findings regarding those three subthemes are presented in this 
subsection.  
6.3.1 Building applications 
In terms of producer empowerment, several employees stressed out the case firm’s 
strong focus on boundary resources, especially when it comes to application 
programming interfaces (API) which can be observed to be prioritized over software 
development kits (SDKs). As commented by Respondent A: ”API first. For every 
feature you add, the platform should have an API that is documented and that can 
be used by third parties.”. Providing extensive and well-documented APIs is hoped 
to improve value-creating capabilities among external parties and enable them to 
build integrations with less involvement from the case firm.  
Another way to empower producers to build applications and integrations is through 
what the case firm sees as partner enablement. In a structured process, the case firm 
provides material to make sure that partners know the core product, invites them to 
explore and test the different features, and informs them about updates and possible 
improvements. Talking about partner enablement, Respondent B exemplified: “I 
think it is important to train our partners. For partners to know the basic features of 
our product is not sufficient. We send a branding book and established a 
standardized form of integration description.”. 
The potential to increase the capabilities of producers is also seen in terms of 
uploading and deploying applications to the marketplace, which is still a very manual 
process. However, priority is given to enable independent building rather than 
independent uploading of applications. Yet, with a growing number of applications, 
the case firm could imagine investing in an easier and therefore more autonomous 
process of uploading and deploying. 
6.3.2 Deciding for a user-case 
To guide developers in their choice of what kind of application to build, the case firm 
brokers information between developers and customers, and supports with the case 
firm’s own expertise. Respondent B explained: 
“The partner and I create a list with use cases, show it to customers and see if 
the list of use cases covers what they want. If not, I look at the partner and come 
up with use cases to discuss with them. We have a common list of like two to 
three use cases that could be standard for each integration.” 
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Apart from the developer-specific elaboration of possible use cases, the case firm 
holds a list with possible use cases, ranked by their importance. When customers 
report the need for additional functionality, the requests get recorded, bundled, and 
assessed by importance and the potential number of interested clients. Talking about 
their process to support developers in providing the right applications and 
integrations, most employees seemed to be confident that sufficient support is given. 
Respondent D commented: “We don’t have integrations where we do not cover the 
critical features of that integration. There might be nice-to-haves and could-haves, 
but the must-haves are there.”. 
6.3.3 Possible feedback loop 
Although information is brokered through the case firm, most employees agreed that 
a direct feedback loop is missing, connecting customers with developers. Only if a 
bug is encountered in an add-on, customer companies might get directly in touch 
with the responsible developer. Additionally, there is also an information gap within 
the customer companies. Respondent E commented on such information gap: “There 
might be integration possibilities that we just do not know because we have not talked 
to people on the ground.”. 
According to Respondent E, in an ideal world, a feedback loop would be in place for 
customers and end-users to provide such information to the case firm and external 
developers. While rolling out the product within customer companies, the case firm 
realized that even with such a feedback loop in place, end-users could not necessarily 
be expected to provide feedback. Firstly, it would not be part of their job and 
secondly, many customer companies would not appreciate if employees would use 
valuable working time to provide feedback to the platform owner. Yet, investigating 
end-user feedback is perceived as extremely valuable. Regardless, such value is 
mainly seen in terms of generating new use cases rather than improving existing 
ones. Respondent E stated: 
“Feedback on already existent apps has not happened until now. Once we 
realize something, that is it. Especially with the apps that we currently have, it 
is mostly maintenance that we have to take care of. […] I can’t think of a single 
case where we have taken an integration and then completely revamped it or 
continued developing it […] Typically once it is released, it is in its final state.” 
This is explained by the case firm's previous heavy focus on using its limited 
resources to diversify the offering of use cases. To get as many customers as possible 
to try marketplace applications, the number of applications was pushed to be 
sufficient to cover various needs. Thus, the recent focus was on providing a vast 
number of applications rather than increasing the value of single applications. 
However, while conducting the interviews, the case firm’s general strategic objective 
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for the marketplace had just shifted from focusing on increasing the volume of add-
ons towards making them more accessible and used. Respondent E stressed, that 
once the marketplace would be economically viable, the focus might shift to 
improving single applications. Respondent A suggested the ability to rate and 
comment on applications within the marketplace to allow the case firm and 
customers easy access to application usage and perception. Nonetheless, Respondent 
A added that such an initiative would be given low priority: 
“Until we don’t have a lot of apps, we can also share this feedback directly with 
the developer. Definitely automate this part of the process, but it is about 
resources and where to invest those resources. […] With the resources we have 
at the moment, I would not invest there.” 
6.4 Interconnection 
Although the respondents substantially differed in their assessment of the variables’ 
importance, all respondents articulated an interconnection between the variables and 
that they should be balanced according to the particular context of the case firm. 
Other than suggesting that the variables indeed interact in some interconnected 
manner, producer capability and transaction efficiency were seen as enablers for 
user volume. The indicated interconnection was verbalized by Respondent C when 
talking about other successful marketplaces as: 
“[…] every big or significant marketplace has quite strong developer 
capabilities beneath it. Same with transaction efficiency. Take any pieces of the 
puzzle out of the equation, and they would not have a huge user volume […] 
and everything falls apart. Those are kind of the three bread and butter elements 
that are somehow interconnected to each other, they don't work without each 
other.” 
User volume constitutes as aforementioned of customer and producer volume. 
Respondent D elaborated further on the interconnection and explicitly reasoned 
around how the variables interact: 
“Developer capability is essential to ramp up the volume of inventory. Ramping 
up that is extremely important so that there is a larger number of inventories for 
users to find whatever their needs might be. Because with developer capability, 
we enable developer volume. Or actually, growing developer volume without 
developer capability probably does not make any sense. [...] developer 
capability enables developer volume. Transaction efficiency enables customer 
volume." 
Nevertheless, Respondent A also highlighted that good producer capability and 
transaction efficiency without a sufficient customer base may be insufficient for 
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achieving sustainable platform growth. The respondent provided a concrete example 
of Microsoft’s discontinued mobile operation system: 
“[…] Microsoft with their mobile ecosystem or marketplace, I'm sure they 
invested a lot into developer capabilities, and the transaction efficiency was 
probably okay. But they did not have the volume and they just tried to pay 
developers to build apps. But without the user volume, it just did not work. So 
even if you are paying developers to build apps for you, if you don't have a strong 
user base, then it is not working.” 
6.5 Key findings summary 
The case firm laid out their view of a typical platform journey as incremental; starting 
from providing a static webpage listing partners, all the way to offering a fully 
automated marketplace where applications are out of the box and do not require any 
back-end configuration by the platform owner. In between these extremes lie 
platform states that rely on manual processes to different degrees. The reasoning for 
not building a fully-fledged platform right from the start was mainly articulated as 
being due to lack of resources but also inherent as the platform grew out of a 
marketing initiative. Generally, building a platform on top of their core product made 
the case firm face different contextual limitations. Not only did the platform emerge 
as rather restrictive to maintain the quality and integrity of the core product, but user 
growth proved to be naturally limited due to the need to convert marketplace 
customers from the core product. 
The findings confirm literature in that the three variables were all regarded as key to 
platform growth in the case firm’s setting, although with varying priorities. In 
addition, all respondents articulated an interconnection between the variables, 
reinforcing respectively limiting each other’s impact on platform growth. Producer 
capability and transaction efficiency were seen as enablers for user volume while the 
latter effectively could inhibit the formers’ impact on increased growth. 
The rather manual transaction process deployed on the marketplace was generally 
seen as inefficient but not necessarily hindering the platform to be successful. Given 
limited resources, the case firm perceived brokering as a sufficient transitional 
solution. Investments into further automation would only be considered when the 
number of transactions would exceed the case firm’s capacity to carry out such. 
Consequently, improved transaction efficiency was generally seen as a consequence 
rather than a driver for growth. 
Last but not least, cross-side network effects were regarded as partly present despite 
the limited size of the marketplace. Depending on the size of potential partners, the 
customer volume of the core product was perceived as already providing a critical 
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mass. This helped the case firm to attract initial partners to their marketplace. Once 
the producer volume was large enough to provide what the case firm regarded as 
sufficient add-ons, the strategy shifted towards the current focus on attracting core 





All variables have proven to be interlinked and amplify each other’s impact on 
platform growth. Transaction efficiency, however, has stood out as a variable that 
plays a special role in platform growth which calls for a deeper reflection. Since the 
study captures the given state of the case firm, the insights ought to be understood as 
reflective of platform dynamics and platform strategy in the making. In this section, 
we discuss the nature and applicability of transaction efficiency, shedding light on 
the benefits and downsides of a retroactive perspective on this variable. Further, we 
discuss the idea of understanding the critical mass as a scale that can be impacted by 
transaction efficiency as well as other variables.  
7.1 Nature of transaction efficiency 
Literature widely advocates for setting up digital platforms optimized for minimal 
transaction costs (Leong et al., 2019) and maximal autonomy of users to 
independently execute transactions (Ivarsson & Svahn, 2020; Van Alstyne & 
Schrage, 2016). Our findings confirm that transaction efficiency plays indeed an 
essential role in scaling a platform. However, the findings give reason to regard 
transaction efficiency as a consequence rather than a driver of growth, which 
challenges the common assumption in literature that optimal transaction efficiency 
should be set up right from the start. Respondents expressed that investments into 
increased transaction efficiency are only seen as necessary when the previously set 
up transaction mechanisms are no longer efficient enough to support the growing 
demand for transactions. The retroactive perspective also challenges the idealization 
of orchestration as the dominant transaction type for digital platforms (Gawer, 2014; 
Hein, Schreieck, et al., 2019). The findings indicate brokering to be generally 
regarded by the case firm as sufficient for the current state of their marketplace. 
Orchestration, on the other hand, viewed as a state of maximized transaction 
autonomy and efficiency, is rather seen as a vision than as a necessity. 
The findings generally suggest that in the case of pursuing a hybrid business model, 
the common journey to build a platform in the form of a digital marketplace consists 
of several consequent steps. This incremental platform journey challenges previous 
work, where deploying a platform has usually been metaphorized as making a leap 
(Van Alstyne et al., 2016; Zhu & Furr, 2016). In parallel with the observed platform 
journey, transaction efficiency is expected to incrementally increase, ultimately 
resulting in a fully automated marketplace. Nevertheless, the observed platform 
journey brings technological, organizational as well as strategic legacy issues. Often 
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growing out of a marketing initiative, a digital marketplace is initially set up to 
generate leads and support the core business. To avoid such legacy-related 
limitations, practitioners are recommended to regard the platform as a standalone 
product with its own logic and mechanisms. Employees working on the platform 
ought to have fresh mindsets to break out of previous ways of thinking and working. 
As such, firms need to separate the logic, premises, and assertions on which the core 
product and the platform are based to fully harvest the potential of the platform.  
Nevertheless, the findings generally indicate that the incremental platform journey 
is not only undertaken for strategic reasons, but also due to limited resources that 
prevent a firm from going full speed ahead with a fully automated platform right 
from the start. 
Driving rapid conversion to the new platform has been identified in literature as key 
to successfully deploy a hybrid business model (Zhu & Furr, 2016). Additionally, 
literature commonly advises to concentrate on one side of the platform to grow the 
other, and subsequently both sides through bidirectional network effects (Gawer, 
2014; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005). The case firm has successfully leveraged 
unidirectional network effects to attract external developers and ensure that the 
marketplace provides various valuable add-ons. Nevertheless, they are struggling to 
leverage bidirectional network effects that would also drive the conversion of core 
product customers into marketplace customers. Applying our framework as a 
conceptual lens uncovers that the absence of bidirectional network effects is likely 
to be the result of low transaction efficiency.  This sheds light on the downsides of a 
retroactive perspective on transaction efficiency. Customers are not able to 
sufficiently explore add-ons on the marketplace, and costly and time-consuming 
processes need to be executed before the add-ons can actually be experienced. 
Although the case firm stresses out that brokering is a sufficient way to bridge 
between producers and customers, it might be the focus on brokering that distracts 
the case firm from investing in sufficiently efficient transaction mechanisms that 
enable network effects. 
To sum up, the perception of growth and transaction efficiency seems to differ 
between practice and what literature generally proposes. While literature emphasizes 
that high transaction efficiency is of utmost importance from the inception of a 
platform, our findings show that the case firm holds another opinion in that it is rather 
preferable to increase transaction efficiency incrementally and retroactively as the 
platform grows. Consequently, in order to address this inconsistency, further 
research is called upon to bring clarity whether it is the contextual limitations, lack 




7.2 Critical mass as a scale 
Reaching the critical mass has been described in literature as essential to allow 
network effects to take off and drive self-reinforcing platform growth (Mancha et al., 
2019; Van Alstyne & Parker, 2017; Zhu & Furr, 2016). Firms are advised to costly 
subsidize one market side, to reach the critical mass and consequently grow both 
market sides (Gawer, 2014; Rochet & Tirole, 2003). However, little attention has 
been given to whether the critical mass can be lowered rather than forcing the volume 
of one market side to reach a magic threshold. Literature has suggested that there is 
a link between critical mass and producers (Mancha et al., 2019), but very limited 
literature addresses the underlying building blocks of the critical mass and how the 
critical mass can be altered. Our findings suggest that the critical mass depends on 
certain factors and should be treated as a scale rather than a binary threshold. In line 
with the key variables amplifying each other’s impact on platform growth, the 
critical mass is expected to not only be lowered by increased producer capability but 
also substantially by increased transaction efficiency.  
As the study only examines a rather limited scope of variables, it is likely to only 
scratch the surface as to what critical mass depends on. As for now, practitioners are 
advised to lower the critical mass by making producer contribution more valuable 
and easier accessible. A lower critical mass will in its turn make it easier, and alike 
faster, to enjoy self-sustainable growth and thus grow the digital platform. This is 
practical implication can be illustrated by the case firm struggling to convert 
customers to the marketplace even though the developer and add-on volume had 
been fostered and was regarded as sufficient to attract customers. Shedding light on 
the scalability of the critical mass as well as its dynamic relationship with certain 
variables opens the general discussion to what factors influence the critical mass and 
how it can be reduced. Research on this topic would be valuable for further 
elaboration of platform growth models, and potentially challenge the current focus 
on user volume to reach the critical mass. 
7.3 The framework 
The findings confirm literature in that the variables user volume, transaction 
efficiency, and producer capability are key to foster platform growth. Further, the 
findings support the suggested dynamic relationship, where the variables amplify 
respectively limit each other’s impact on platform growth. The importance and 
dynamic relationship of the presented variables support our new framework that 
better represents the complexity of platform growth and thus helps practitioners to 
guide their efforts in growing a platform. In essence, practitioners ought to focus on 
all three identified variables since any overlooked variable can limit the overall 
growth. If one variable requires significantly less effort to be improved than another, 
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it can be an opportunity to reinforce the other variables’ impact on platform growth. 
Similarly, if one variable is restricted, intensifying efforts on the others can partly 
compensate for such limitation. Consequently, we recommend practitioners to 
frequently assess the variables to spot any major unbalances which latently hamper 
platform growth. 
In the specific context of a hybrid business model, our findings indicate that the 
literature on platform growth and actual practice particularly differ due to 
contextualities and limitations arising from the core business. This can be 
exemplified in that platform users need to be converted from the pre-existing 
customer base of the core business, or in that the case firm controls the content 
provided by external developers to keep up the quality and integrity of the core 
product. Deploying a rather closed marketplace with a limited volume of producers, 
customers, and provided products/services, changes the basic premises platform 
literature is based upon which seems to make hybrid business platform growth 
especially challenging.  
The issues arising from pursuing a hybrid business model underline the importance 
of applying our proposed framework, since it helps leaders to understand the 
variables and mechanisms behind platform growth. Consequently, our framework 





Our study provides insights on the roles that the variables user volume, transaction 
efficiency, and producer capability play in platform growth. The findings show that 
the variables are interconnected, mutually amplifying respectively limiting each 
other’s impact on the overall platform growth. Additionally, the study contributes 
with four key insights about the platform journey, the nature of transaction 
efficiency, and how the variables impact critical mass. 1) Building a digital platform 
can be seen as an incremental journey. The envisioned journey is not necessarily 
undertaken for strategic reasons, but also due to limited resources that prevent a firm 
from going full speed ahead with a fully automated platform right from the start. 2) 
Consequently, transaction efficiency is regarded as a consequence rather than a 
driver of growth (which challenges the common assumption in literature that optimal 
transaction efficiency should be set up right from the start). 3) The findings suggest 
that the absence of bidirectional network effects might result from low transaction 
efficiency, shedding light on the downsides of a retroactive perspective on 
transaction efficiency. 4) Our findings suggest that the critical mass depends on 
transaction efficiency and producer capability as well as possible other factors and 
thus should be treated as a scale rather than a binary threshold. 
The framework proposed in this study will help firms to foster platform growth by 
better representing the complex and dynamic reality and hence allowing greater 
applicability as a single growth model. As a conceptual lens, the framework has 
helped the researchers to guide the study’s focus and uncover the lack of bidirectional 
network effects that results from low transaction efficiency. Lastly, the study calls 
for further research that focuses on the nature of the critical mass, the retroactive 
handling of transaction efficiency, and the applicability of the combined framework 
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Example excerpt of coding from the digital catalog. 





“I don’t see it [producer volume] expanding drastically in the near 




“Customers don't just show up by themselves, actually, they need to 
close down a contract with [the case firm] first” 
Critical 
mass 
“A developer would not build on top of a platform that does not have 
any users. […] The exact number probably also depends on the 
partner. I think for a start-up, or a pre-series A company, we 
already have a very interesting number of customers and users. But 
for a company like Microsoft, we don't. I think that a pre-series A 
start-up would build things on top of [the case firm]. But for 
companies like Microsoft, we actually have to build the integrations, 
or we have to ask the partner to build the integrations for us.” 
Network 
effects 
“Marketplace as a lead generation tool […] you attract developers 
to have more apps. […] When we have more apps on the 
marketplace, that should help us attracting more customers. […] 
Developers get attracted by a strong customer or user base.” 
 
